astrbot_plugin_private_comp.../p5_ingress_firewall.py

380 行
13 KiB
Python

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""Pure P5-A source-to-sink shadow firewall contract.
This module is deliberately detached from AstrBot, prompts, persistence, and
tool execution. It accepts only small, typed metadata segments and returns a
new JSON-compatible advisory record. ``allow`` therefore means that a normal
sink may retain the segment as *non-executing evidence*; it never grants an
execution capability. P5-A callers must not treat this module as a live gate.
The contract accepts exactly these input fields::
{
"source_kind": "forwarded_text",
"trust": "T3",
"event_id": "message-123", # or ``source_hash``
"sink": "prompt_context",
"security_state": "allowed", # optional P2/P3 state
}
No input prose field is accepted. Results expose only enum metadata and a
stable event id or SHA-256 digest; invalid untrusted values are never echoed
back into the audit projection.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from copy import deepcopy
import re
import unicodedata
from typing import Any
FIREWALL_SCHEMA_VERSION = "p5.ingress_firewall.v1"
# Public sets are immutable so an importing runtime cannot quietly extend the
# contract in-process. New sources or sinks require a versioned P5 decision.
TRUST_LEVELS = frozenset({"T0", "T1", "T2", "T3", "T4"})
SOURCE_KINDS = frozenset({
"policy_config",
"verified_authorization",
"current_user_intent",
"forwarded_text",
"quoted_text",
"vision_summary",
"tool_output",
"web_extract",
"memory_recall",
"derived_summary",
"legacy_memory",
})
SINKS = frozenset({
"prompt_context",
"memory_recall",
"bridge_serialize",
"tool_execution",
"external_export",
"cross_user_read",
})
HIGH_RISK_SINKS = frozenset({"tool_execution", "external_export", "cross_user_read"})
SECURITY_STATES = frozenset({
"allowed", "sanitized", "blocked", "quarantined", "unavailable", "rejected",
})
MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 64
MAX_FORMAT_CONTROLS = 8
MAX_SOURCE_KIND_CHARS = 48
MAX_TRUST_CHARS = 8
MAX_EVENT_ID_CHARS = 128
MAX_SOURCE_HASH_CHARS = 71
MAX_SINK_CHARS = 48
MAX_SECURITY_STATE_CHARS = 20
_ALLOWED_FIELDS = frozenset({"source_kind", "trust", "event_id", "source_hash", "sink", "security_state"})
_PROSE_FIELDS = frozenset({
"content", "text", "prompt", "body", "message", "raw", "payload", "summary",
"html", "media", "transcript", "ocr", "url",
})
_EVENT_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:@/+-]{0,127}\Z")
_SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}\Z")
_SOURCE_TRUST = {
"policy_config": "T0",
"verified_authorization": "T1",
"current_user_intent": "T2",
"forwarded_text": "T3",
"quoted_text": "T3",
"vision_summary": "T3",
"tool_output": "T3",
"web_extract": "T3",
"memory_recall": "T4",
"derived_summary": "T4",
"legacy_memory": "T4",
}
_DENIED_SECURITY_STATES = frozenset({"blocked", "quarantined", "unavailable", "rejected"})
_FORMAT_CONTROL_CATEGORIES = frozenset({"Cf"})
def evaluate_ingress_segment(segment: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return a deterministic, non-executing P5-A disposition for one segment.
The input is not mutated. Invalid, missing, unknown, and source/trust
mismatches become ``shadow_quarantine`` for ordinary sinks and
``deny_high_risk`` for tool/export/cross-user sinks. Every high-risk sink
is denied in P5-A, including T0/T1/T2, because this phase creates evidence
only and has no execution authority.
"""
normalized, errors, normalization_flags = _normalize_segment(segment)
audit = _audit_projection(normalized, normalization_flags)
sink = normalized["sink"]
high_risk = sink in HIGH_RISK_SINKS
if errors:
reason_codes = _stable_codes("invalid_segment", *errors)
if high_risk:
reason_codes = _stable_codes(*reason_codes, "high_risk_sink_denied")
disposition = "deny_high_risk"
else:
reason_codes = _stable_codes(*reason_codes, "invalid_source_shadowed")
disposition = "shadow_quarantine"
return _result(disposition, reason_codes, audit)
security_state = normalized["security_state"]
if security_state in _DENIED_SECURITY_STATES:
reason_codes = ["upstream_security_denied"]
if high_risk:
reason_codes.append("high_risk_sink_denied")
return _result("deny_high_risk", reason_codes, audit)
reason_codes.append("upstream_security_shadowed")
return _result("shadow_quarantine", reason_codes, audit)
# A non-ASCII-normalized authority label is safe to observe but cannot be
# silently upgraded to an ordinary allow result.
if normalization_flags and normalized["trust"] in {"T0", "T1", "T2"}:
if high_risk:
return _result(
"deny_high_risk",
["normalized_authority_metadata", "high_risk_sink_denied"],
audit,
)
return _result(
"shadow_quarantine",
["normalized_authority_metadata", "normalization_shadowed"],
audit,
)
if high_risk:
# This includes T0/T1/T2 by design. The audit flag below makes the
# absence of execution authority mechanically visible to future users.
return _result(
"deny_high_risk",
["p5a_nonexecuting", "high_risk_sink_denied"],
audit,
)
if normalized["trust"] in {"T3", "T4"}:
return _result(
"shadow_quarantine",
["untrusted_source_shadowed", "p5a_nonexecuting"],
audit,
)
if security_state == "sanitized":
return _result(
"shadow_quarantine",
["sanitized_source_shadowed", "p5a_nonexecuting"],
audit,
)
return _result("allow", ["evidence_only_nonexecuting"], audit)
def evaluate_ingress_segments(segments: object) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Evaluate a bounded batch without changing the input collection.
A non-list or an oversized batch returns one deterministic invalid result
rather than iterating unbounded data. Each normal batch member is handled
by :func:`evaluate_ingress_segment` independently.
"""
if not isinstance(segments, list):
return {
"schema_version": FIREWALL_SCHEMA_VERSION,
"results": [
_result(
"shadow_quarantine",
["invalid_batch", "invalid_source_shadowed"],
_empty_audit(),
)
],
"summary": {"count": 0, "allow": 0, "shadow_quarantine": 1, "deny_high_risk": 0},
}
if len(segments) > MAX_BATCH_SIZE:
return {
"schema_version": FIREWALL_SCHEMA_VERSION,
"results": [
_result(
"shadow_quarantine",
["batch_limit_exceeded", "invalid_source_shadowed"],
_empty_audit(),
)
],
"summary": {"count": 0, "allow": 0, "shadow_quarantine": 1, "deny_high_risk": 0},
}
results = [evaluate_ingress_segment(item) for item in segments]
summary = {
"count": len(results),
"allow": sum(result["disposition"] == "allow" for result in results),
"shadow_quarantine": sum(result["disposition"] == "shadow_quarantine" for result in results),
"deny_high_risk": sum(result["disposition"] == "deny_high_risk" for result in results),
}
return {"schema_version": FIREWALL_SCHEMA_VERSION, "results": results, "summary": summary}
def _result(disposition: str, reason_codes: list[str] | tuple[str, ...], audit: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"schema_version": FIREWALL_SCHEMA_VERSION,
"disposition": disposition,
"reason_codes": list(reason_codes),
"execution_authority": "none",
"audit": audit,
}
def _normalize_segment(segment: object) -> tuple[dict[str, str], list[str], list[str]]:
base = {
"source_kind": "invalid",
"trust": "invalid",
"event_id": "",
"source_hash": "",
"sink": "invalid",
"security_state": "",
}
if not isinstance(segment, dict):
return base, ["segment_not_object"], []
# Never mutate or retain the supplied mapping. Its keys are also bounded
# before comparing them, so values cannot smuggle raw prose through an
# otherwise unknown key.
errors: list[str] = []
if len(segment) > len(_ALLOWED_FIELDS):
errors.append("field_limit_exceeded")
raw_keys = list(segment.keys())
if any(not isinstance(key, str) for key in raw_keys):
errors.append("field_name_invalid")
prose_keys = sorted(key for key in raw_keys if isinstance(key, str) and key in _PROSE_FIELDS)
if prose_keys:
errors.append("prose_field_forbidden")
unknown_keys = sorted(
key for key in raw_keys
if isinstance(key, str) and key not in _ALLOWED_FIELDS
)
if unknown_keys:
errors.append("unknown_field")
flags: list[str] = []
for field, maximum in (
("source_kind", MAX_SOURCE_KIND_CHARS),
("trust", MAX_TRUST_CHARS),
("event_id", MAX_EVENT_ID_CHARS),
("source_hash", MAX_SOURCE_HASH_CHARS),
("sink", MAX_SINK_CHARS),
("security_state", MAX_SECURITY_STATE_CHARS),
):
if field not in segment:
continue
value, value_errors, value_flags = _normalize_token(segment.get(field), maximum)
if value_errors:
errors.extend(f"{field}_{code}" for code in value_errors)
continue
base[field] = value
flags.extend(value_flags)
for required in ("source_kind", "trust", "sink"):
if required not in segment:
errors.append(f"{required}_missing")
event_present = "event_id" in segment
hash_present = "source_hash" in segment
if event_present == hash_present:
errors.append("reference_required_or_ambiguous")
# An ambiguous reference is not audit-safe. Do not select or echo one
# of the caller values merely because it happened to be syntactically
# valid.
base["event_id"] = ""
base["source_hash"] = ""
elif event_present and not _EVENT_ID_RE.fullmatch(base["event_id"]):
errors.append("event_id_invalid")
base["event_id"] = ""
elif hash_present and not _SHA256_RE.fullmatch(base["source_hash"]):
errors.append("source_hash_invalid")
base["source_hash"] = ""
if base["source_kind"] not in SOURCE_KINDS:
errors.append("source_kind_invalid")
base["source_kind"] = "invalid"
if base["trust"] not in TRUST_LEVELS:
errors.append("trust_invalid")
base["trust"] = "invalid"
elif base["source_kind"] != "invalid" and _SOURCE_TRUST[base["source_kind"]] != base["trust"]:
errors.append("source_trust_mismatch")
if base["sink"] not in SINKS:
errors.append("sink_invalid")
base["sink"] = "invalid"
if "security_state" in segment:
if base["security_state"] not in SECURITY_STATES:
errors.append("security_state_invalid")
base["security_state"] = ""
# Repeated fields must not change result ordering. A normalized marker is
# retained only as a small enum, never as a copy of caller text.
return base, _stable_codes(*errors), _stable_codes(*flags)
def _normalize_token(value: object, maximum: int) -> tuple[str, list[str], list[str]]:
if not isinstance(value, str):
return "", ["not_string"], []
if len(value) > maximum + MAX_FORMAT_CONTROLS:
return "", ["too_long"], []
normalized = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", value)
flags: list[str] = []
if normalized != value:
flags.append("unicode_nfkc")
format_controls = 0
visible_controls = 0
kept: list[str] = []
for character in normalized:
category = unicodedata.category(character)
if category in _FORMAT_CONTROL_CATEGORIES:
format_controls += 1
continue
if category == "Cc":
visible_controls += 1
continue
kept.append(character)
if format_controls:
flags.append("format_controls_removed")
if visible_controls:
return "", ["control_character"], []
if format_controls > MAX_FORMAT_CONTROLS:
return "", ["format_control_limit"], []
result = "".join(kept)
if len(result) > maximum:
return "", ["too_long"], []
return result, [], flags
def _audit_projection(normalized: dict[str, str], normalization_flags: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
reference_kind = "none"
reference = ""
if normalized["event_id"]:
reference_kind, reference = "event_id", normalized["event_id"]
elif normalized["source_hash"]:
reference_kind, reference = "source_hash", normalized["source_hash"]
return {
"source_kind": normalized["source_kind"],
"trust": normalized["trust"],
"sink": normalized["sink"],
"security_state": normalized["security_state"] or "not_supplied",
"reference_kind": reference_kind,
"reference": reference,
"normalization_flags": list(normalization_flags),
}
def _empty_audit() -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"source_kind": "invalid",
"trust": "invalid",
"sink": "invalid",
"security_state": "not_supplied",
"reference_kind": "none",
"reference": "",
"normalization_flags": [],
}
def _stable_codes(*codes: str) -> list[str]:
return sorted({code for code in codes if code})