AstrBot-Desktop/CHANGELOG.md
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feat(chat): advance Q10-Q15 experience
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# Changelog
## [0.1.0-alpha.2] - 2026-07-20
### Added
- Q6-Q8 companion state, multi-monitor safe placement, read-only diagnostics, proactive-message handling, quiet hours, and Web Speech MVP.
- Q9 local session recovery marker and release validation checklist.
### Fixed
- Streaming chat history isolation and completed-message persistence across both slots.
- Tray exit, hidden-window cleanup, and release build packaging regressions.
### Notes
- This is an unsigned local Windows build. Automatic updates and code signing are not configured.
## Unreleased
### Added
- Q10-Q15 chat experience increment: lightweight Markdown rendering, message actions, generation controls, session actions, connection controls, and responsive chat layout.
- AstrBot OpenAPI adapter foundation: SSE mapper, dual-slot runtime skeleton, credential enrollment IPC, transport-aware profiles (ADR-0005).
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and versions follow Semantic Versioning.
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Authoritative architecture, implementation, and repository workflow documents.
- Repository rules, ignore rules, implementation plan, progress tracking, and decision log.
- Tauri 2, React, TypeScript, Vite, and Rust workspace skeleton with tray and single-instance lifecycle.
- Independent companion and operations REST/SSE clients with local profile binding, cancellation, reconnect, Last-Event-ID, and per-slot deduplication.
- Windows Credential Manager, bounded UI Automation, selected-window in-memory capture, Event Log, process, port, foreground-window, authorized log-tail, configuration parsing, and redaction Spikes.
- Recoverable plan/dry-run/copy/verify/commit file transactions with no-overwrite conflict policies and source preservation.
- Composite-key SQLite isolation for profile, server, conversation, message, cursor, proposal, and transaction data.
- Provisional desktop-v1alpha1 Rust types, TypeScript exports, ten JSON Schemas, drift checks, and two loopback-only Mock Gateway instances.
- Frontend, browser, Rust, integration, Windows provider, soak, and Forgejo CI test entry points.
- P00 dependency review and durable Spike result records.
- Persistent SQLite application-data initialization with transactional `user_version` migration and future-version rejection.
- Strict Zod validation for the Rust bootstrap IPC payload, including the active database schema version.
- Redacting tracing output writer with structured-field, bearer-token, URL-credential, private-key, and known-secret coverage.
- P01 migration, logging, IPC validation, real Tauri startup, and production-build verification.
- SQLite schema v2 for persistent non-sensitive ConnectionProfile metadata.
- Bounded Rust-owned Profile list/create/update/delete IPC with generated UUIDs and timestamps.
- Strict frontend ConnectionProfile Schemas and a basic Profile management UI.
- Migration, five-Profile CRUD, persistent reopen, secret-field rejection, and browser fallback tests.
- Persistent dual companion/operations slot assignment with SQLite schema v3 and bounded list/assign/clear IPC.
- Auto-connect configuration validation for at most two Profiles with distinct slots.
- Runtime operations switch guard that blocks operations slot changes while an operations task is active.
- Duplicate `server_instance_id` warnings without silently merging Profiles.
### Security
- Kept credentials and native capabilities in Rust; the React capability set remains `core:default` only.
- Added secret redaction and repository scans; no arbitrary PowerShell, CMD, shell, input-injection, registry-write, or unrestricted filesystem API is exposed.
- Kept real UNC writes, signing keys, updater keys, and release secrets outside P00.
- Rejected Token, password, API Key, URL credential, query-string credential, and unknown fields at the Profile IPC boundary.
- Required explicit approval for insecure HTTP and kept slots, connections, and credential enrollment outside P01.